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Abstract
Financial stability in Europe has received renewed attention with the advent of a common
currency, wave of mergers and acquisitions among financial institutions, and greater
market competition (e.g. ECB, 1999; IMF, 1999; OECD, 1999). This paper examines
whether EU country banking systems are particularly vulnerable to systemic risk at
present. Our approach is to examine episodes of banking sector distress for a large sample
of countries, highlighting the experience of the EU. We estimate multivariate probit models
linking the likelihood of banking problems to a set of macroeconomic variables and
institutional characteristics. Institutional characteristics, made available by a new data set
on corporate governance in the financial sector not previously used in this type of analysis,
include aspects of bank supervision and regulation, restrictions on bank portfolios, and
development of the banking system. Given these characteristics, the model predicts a low
probability of banking sector distress in EMU countries.
*This paper was prepared for the workshop “Structural Change and European Economic
Integration,” held at Liseleje, Denmark on 10-11 September 1999, sponsored by the Economic
Policy Research Unit of the University of Copenhagen. Valuable comments by workshop
participants and research assistance from Kathleen McDill are gratefully acknowledged.1
 1. Introduction
Episodes of banking distress have become commonplace during the past two decades, but the range
of experience in terms of the nature of banking sector distress, causes and effects, vary widely across
countries and time periods. A review of the experiences of 18 Western European countries (EU member
states, Iceland, Norway and Switzerland), reveals that 12 had some form of banking sector distress (14
episodes in total) during the past 25 years. Of these cases, most did not pose systemic risks to the entire
financial system. Only the banking problems that surfaced in Finland (1991-94), Norway (1987-93), Spain
(1977-85) and Sweden (1990-93) were of an order of magnitude, depth and breath threatening the entire
banking system (“crisis” episodes)
1.
Financial stability in Europe has received renewed attention with the advent of a common currency,
wave of mergers and acquisitions among financial institutions, and greater market competition (e.g. ECB,
1999; IMF, 1999; OECD, 1999). Some analysts view the new environment facing European banks as
particular risky at present. The International Monetary Fund argues that ensuring financial stability within
EMU will be particularly challenging in the early years, when systemic risks might be on the rise (IMF,
1999; p.105). Another recent report concludes that “Banks, European banks in particular, appear to be
vulnerable to economic accidents such as Asia and Russia and, in some respects, more fragile than ever
before…” (Danthine, Giavazzi, Vives and von Thadden, 1999, p. 100). Even the European Central Bank
sees increased risks in some areas of finance as a direct consequence of EMU (ECB, 1999). 
Despite these concerns, very little empirical evidence has been brought to bear on whether
European banking systems are particularly vulnerable to systemic risk at this juncture. To address this
issue, we build upon a recent literature linking episodes of banking sector distress to economic
developments using cross-country panel data sets (e.g. Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache, 1998a,b; Glick
and Hutchison, 1999; Hutchison and McDill, 1999; Kaminsky and Reinhart, 1999).  Following this
                                                       
1 The "significant" versus "crisis" characterization is form Lindgren, et al. (1996). The cases of European
banking distress are shown in Appendix Table 1.2
approach, we evaluate the extent to which previous episodes of banking sector distress in Europe appear to
fit established international patterns and whether anticipated changes in the European economy associated
with EMU will influence the likelihood of banking sector distress. We consider a sample of 90 countries
(18 Western European) over the 1975-97 period, of which 74 had banking problems of a “significant” or
“crisis” nature at some point and several had multiple episodes (90 episodes in total). We estimate
probability models (probit equations) with both a panel and cross-section that are designed to test the
likelihood of an episode of banking sector distress occurring given macroeconomic developments and
institutional characteristics.
We make two innovations to the general literature on the empirical determinants of banking sector
distress, both of which are directly relevant to the European experience. Firstly, we consider how
institutional variables on the regulatory and financial environment facing banks in various countries, and
the EMU area in particular, affect the probability that banking sector distress may arise. This type of
analysis is now possible because of new internationally comparable information on institutions following
the arduous data collection in the area of corporate governance, financial regulation and banking by La
Porta et al. (1998), Barth et al. (1998), Levine (1998) and Mauro (1995).  Although these studies address
different issues, the institutional data they employ is directly relevant to the issues that we investigate. This
is important because institutions are often an important distinguishing feature of industrial countries such
as those in the EMU zone and the rest of the world. Previous work has highlighted that industrial countries
are "different", and have generally lower probabilities of banking sector problems arising (e.g. Hutchison
and McDill, 1999), but have failed to isolate the reason for this empirical observation. We conjecture that
differences in institutions (governmental and legal structures) are likely to be important.
Secondly, previous work has largely been focused on episodes of banking distress where this
signifies any significant banking problem. By contrast, we distinguish between banking "distress" and
"crisis", where the latter indicates a banking problem posing a systemic risk to the entire financial sector.
This proves an important distinction, as the factors contributing to major disruptions (crises) are easier to3
identify and demonstrate common features that are not evident otherwise. This is especially important in
Europe since only four cases of major disruptions (in Finland, Norway, Sweden and Spain) have occurred
since 1975, as opposed to numerous smaller cases of banking distress.
In section 2 we discuss the determinants of banking crises, focusing in particular on the new
institutional and legal characteristics that we investigate. In section 3 we describe the data and
methodology. In section 4 we analyze the key macroeconomic and institutional characteristics, focusing on
those aspects that distinguish the European countries from others experiencing episodes of banking sector
distress. Section 5 presents estimates of the probit model, and considers the predictions of the model for
European countries. Section 6 concludes the paper and raises the questions of whether Europe is
particularly at risk for future systemic banking problems.
2. Determinants of Banking Sector Distress
The theoretical literature on the determinants of banking sector distress may be categorized by three
groups of models: "bank run" models (e.g. Diamond and Dybvig, 1983), "adverse shock/credit channel"
models (e.g. Bernanke, et al., 1992; Gertler, 1992), and "moral hazard" models. These models emphasize
different determinants of banking sector problems. The bank run model focuses on "non-fundamental"
factors, multiple equilibrium, and the possibility that shifts in expectations can set off a bank run and
liquidity crisis in the banking system. The adverse shock/credit channel model focuses on adverse economic
shocks, informational asymmetries between borrowers and lenders, and how recessions and collapsing asset
prices may bring on credit crunches and episodes of banking distress. The moral hazard explanation
focuses on how government guarantees and weak regulatory and supervisory policies may lead to excessive
risk taking (involving both domestic and foreign asset and liability positions) and a higher probability of
banking distress sector distress.
The empirical literature has identified several variables associated with banking crises that are
consistent with one or more theoretical models. The macroeconomic variables identified-- mainly associated4
adverse shock/credit channel model-- are real GDP growth (e.g. Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache, 1998a,
Hutchison and McDill, 1999), inflation (e.g. Hutchison and McDill, 1999), and various measures
turbulence in foreign exchange markets (e.g. Eichengreen and Rose, 1998; Kaminsky and Reinhart, 1999;
and Glick and Hutchison, 1999). The main institutional variable identified, mainly associated with the
moral hazard explanation since it allows more portfolio flexibility and risk-taking on the part of banks, is
financial liberalization (e.g. Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache, 1998a and Glick and Hutchison, 1999).
These four variables (real GDP, inflation, exchange rate turbulence and financial liberalization) are
the explanatory variables of our base ("canonical") model of banking sector distress
2. Our objective is to
extending the canonical model, in addition to the European dimension, to focus on the institutional features
capturing financial structure, development and regulation.
Legal and Regulatory Environment, Moral Hazard and Banking Sector Stability
A number of recent studies, drawing on new cross-country data sets, have attempted to measure the
impact of differing legal and institutional structures on the economy. La Porta et al. (1998) investigate the
extent to which legal rules, and their enforcement, cover protection of corporate shareholders and creditors,
and how rules affect the pattern of corporate ownership. Levine (1998) investigates whether cross-country
differences in the legal rights of creditors and contract enforcement explain differences in the level of
banking sector development and economic growth. Demirgüç-Kunt and Levine (1999) present stylized facts
concerning the relationship between financial structure and economic development and the links between
financial structure and legal, regulatory and policy determinants for a broad cross-section of countries.
                                                       
2 Several other macroeconomic variables were considered, but not reported since they did not contribute
significantly to the explanatory power of the model. These variables are real credit growth, nominal (and real)
interest rate changes, the budget position of the general government, and explicit deposit insurance. The explicit
deposit insurance dummy variable is from the recent survey by Kyei (1995). Indices of stock prices, real estate
prices and aggregate asset prices were also considered. However, the asset price data is only available for a small
sample of countries and was therefore not included in the base regressions. The evolution of these variables in
relation to the onset of banking crises is shown in the summary statistics, but not reported in the probit regressions.5
Barth et al.(1998) focus on the regulation and supervision of the banking sector and ask whether regulatory
restrictions on banks are a substitute for the strength of the government capacity and bureaucratic system.
They also consider the link between regulatory restrictions and developments in the banking system.
These studies have not considered how the institutional characteristics of countries influence the
likelihood of financial instability and banking sector distress,
3 nor have they focused on Europe. These
types of institutional characteristics, however, are in principle important determinants of banking distress in
line with the moral hazard/lax supervision theory. The way banks are regulated and supervised, accounting
standards, and other characteristics of the financial system bare directly on the extent to which government
guarantees and moral hazard translates into higher risk taking on the part of banks.
To address this issue, we consider several institutional characteristics of particular importance to
the financial sector and highlighting the relevance to Europe: three addressing the regulatory environment
(and information disclosure) and three addressing the financial environment. The regulatory environment is
measured by three factors: a composite index of the quality of the governmental/bureaucratic system
("government"); the extent that contract law is enforced ("enforcement"); and the extent that public
corporations disclosure financial information about their balance sheets and operations ("accounting").  We
expect that a stronger governmental/bureaucratic system, more rigorous enforcement of contract law, and
greater financial disclosure would all lead to greater financial stability and lower risk of a serious banking
problem arising.
The financial environment is measured by two factors in addition to financial liberalization
(included in the canonical model): restrictions on the activities of banks ("restrictions"), and the size and
development of the banking sector ("banking"). A priori, one might expect that liberalization of interest
rates, fewer restrictions on bank portfolios, and a less developed banking system would to associated with a
higher probability of banking instability.
                                                       
3 The only exception is Barth et al. (1998). They focus on the link between legal restrictions on banking
activity and the likelihood of a banking crisis.6
3. Data and Methodology
Defining Banking Distress
Banking problems are usually difficult to identify empirically because of data limitations. Most
studies have employed a combination of events to identify and date the occurrence of significant banking
sector problems. Institutional events usually include forced closure, merger, or government intervention in
the operations of financial institutions, runs on banks, or the extension of large-scale government
assistance. Other indicators frequently include measures of non-performing assets, problem loans, and so
on. We have identified and dated episodes of banking sector distress following the criteria of Caprio and
Klingebiel (1996, and updated from a personal correspondence in 1999) and Demirgüç-Kunt and
Detragiache (1998a). If an episode of banking distress is identified in either study, it is included in our
sample. Given the differences in magnitude of banking crises, we define two alternative variables: banking
distress and banking crisis. "Banking distress" denotes an episode of banking distress that includes large-
scale disruptions in the banking sector as well as problems of a smaller magnitude. The "banking crisis"
variable, by contrast, includes only large-scale disruptions in the banking sector. The distinction between
small to medium and large-scale disruptions in the banking sector is derived from Caprio and Klingebiel
(1996 and updated by a personal correspondence) and Lindgren et al. (1996).
Other Variables
The data appendix (Appendix Table 2) describes all of the institutional variables and sources of data
in detail. The variable "restrict", adapted from Barth et al. (1998), measures the extent that a country's
regulatory system allows banks to engage in the following nontraditional activities: securities (underwriting,
brokering, dealing and related activities), insurance (underwriting and selling), real estate (real estate
investment, development and management), and non-financial firm ownership. The variable "government"
is a composite index of the quality of the government/bureaucratic system. In principle, a strong system of7
legal enforcement could substitute for weak rules since active and well-functioning courts can step in and
rescue investors abused by the management. To address these issues, LaPorta et al. (1998) examine proxies
for the quality of enforcement of these rights, namely estimates of "law and order" in different countries
compiled by private credit risk agencies for the use of foreign investors interested in doing business in the
respective countries. We look at a weighted average of two such indices to form the "enforcement" variable.
The "accounting" variable is a quantitative measure of the value of information disclosure revealed by
company annual reports. Accounting plays a potentially crucial role in corporate governance. For investors
to know anything about the companies in which they invest, basic accounting standards are needed to
render company disclosures interpretable.
The institutional variable in the canonical model is "liberalization" of deposit interest rates. This
variable is from Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache (1998b), supplemented by national and international
sources. It is constructed on the basis of the beginning of observed policy changes to liberalize interest
rates, taking on a value of unity during the liberalized period of market-determined rates and zero
otherwise. " Exchange rate pressure", following Glick and Hutchison (1999), is constructed from “large”
changes in an index defined as a weighted average of monthly real exchange rate changes and monthly
(percent) reserve losses.
4  The weights are inversely related to the variance of changes of each component
over the sample for each country. Large changes in exchange rate pressure are defined as changes in our
pressure index that exceed the mean plus 2 times the country-specific standard deviation.
5 The source of the
macro data is the International Monetary Fund’s International Financial Statistics (CD-ROM).
Data Samples and Windows
                                                       
4 Our currency pressure measure of crises does not include episodes of defense involving sharp rises in
interest rates. Data for market-determined interest rates is not available for many of the countries or for a large part
of the sample period.
5 Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999) use a three standard deviation cut-off. While the choice of cut-off point
is somewhat arbitrary, Frankel and Rose (1996) suggest that the results are not very sensitive to the precise cut-off
chosen in selecting crisis episodes.8
Our data sample is determined by the availability of data on banking sector health, as well as on the
determinants of bank crises, discussed above. However, we do not confine our analysis to countries
experiencing banking crises. We also include developed and developing countries that did not experience
either a severe banking problem during the 1975-97 sample period.  Using such a broad control group
allows us to make general statements about the conditions that have distinguished countries encountering
crises from those that have not.
The minimum data requirements to be included in our study are that GDP are available for a
minimum of 10 consecutive years over the period 1975-97. This requirement results in a sample of 90
countries. For each country-year in our sample, we construct binary measures of banking sector distress, as
defined above (1 = banking distress, 0 = no distress, i.e. tranquil). Of the 90 countries in our sample, 74
countries had banking problems at some point during the sample period. Several countries had multiple
occurrences of banking sector distress.
In most of our analysis we are concerned with predicting the onset of banking crises and their
relative timing. To reduce the chances of capturing the continuation of the same banking episode, we
impose windows on our data. In the case of multi-year banking crises, we use only the first year in a spell
of banking distress, i.e. the year of the banking sector distress “onset.” The duration of banking sector
distress was greater than one year in most episodes.
We use annual observations in our study. Attempting to date banking sector distress by month (as in
Kaminsky and Reinhart, 1999) or by quarter seems arbitrary.  We employ monthly data for our (real)
exchange rate pressure index to identify currency crises and date each by the year in which it occurs. Of
course, annual data may obscure or limit some insights about the relative timing of the onset of banking
crises, since it does not enable us to distinguish the lead and lag timing of crises to the extent that crises
occur at different points of the same year. However, we do not believe that it is possible to date banking
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crises with such precision as monthly data presumes. Moreover, using annual data enables inclusion of a
relatively large number of countries in the analysis.
4. Statistical Contours
Table 1 presents a summary of the institutional characteristics associated with Europe's financial
and legal systems compared with the broader sample. From the table we observe that the EU countries, on
average, are significantly different from the remainder of the sample for every institutional variable
excepting the measure of accounting standards. And all of these indicators point to better-managed and
more liberalized financial sectors. In particular, all of the EU countries had liberalized deposit interest rates
by the early 1990s compared with 70% of the non-EU group. The EU group also had significantly fewer
restrictions on the portfolio activities of banks (a rank of 4 is most restrictive). The least restrictive banking
controls in the EU  (values less than 1.5) are Austria and the United Kingdom. The EU banking systems
also had more developed systems of financial intermediation, judging by the percent of loans in the
financial system relative to GDP.
In terms of the regulatory environment, the EU area on average also has more competent
governments/bureaucracies, better enforcement of laws, and higher accounting standards than the rest-of-
the-world. Two European countries, the Netherlands and Switzerland, have a value of 10 (the maximum
score possible) for the government variable. The average value of accounting is higher in the EU, but not
significantly different from the non-EU sample average. This variable measures the number of disclosures
(based on a set of 90 criteria) made on corporate income statements, and ranges in the sample from 24
(Egypt) to 83 (Sweden). The highest in Europe were Sweden (83) and the United Kingdom (78), and the
lowest were for Portugal (36) and Greece (55).
A graphical examination of the macroeconomic characteristics around episodes of banking sector
distress is shown in Figure 1. The light solid line shows the mean value of each variable for the group of10
countries that did not experience banking sector distress. The dark solid line (dashed line) shows the
average values for all European episodes (all episodes other than Europe) of banking sector distress. This
"event" study alignment of dates set the data (at time zero) from the first year of the onset of an episode of
banking sector distress.
In economies experiencing banking sector distress, real output growth slowed gradually prior to the
onset of banking problems, dropped sharply at the onset of banking problems and gradually recovered.
Two macroeconomic variables also indicate a shift over episodes of banking distress: real credit growth and
stock price changes. Movements in credit growth and stock prices mirror real GDP growth: gradual decline
in growth rates prior to the onset of problems, sharp drops during the first year as problems emerge, and
moderate rebounds during the latter phase of the episode.
Where does Europe fit into the general pattern? Similar to most countries, declining real GDP
growth, declining credit growth, and weakness in equity markets characterized the Europe group after the
onset of banking distress. Both groups also experienced strong economic recoveries in terms of output
growth and stock price developments following episodes of banking distress. The fluctuation in these
variables around the onset of banking problems, however, was less in the European group than elsewhere.
Real GDP and real credit growth, in particular, demonstrate less pronounced changes. Inflation tended to
fall in Europe with the onset of banking problems, while increasing elsewhere.
4. Probit Estimation Results
This section presents a multivariate probit analysis to estimate how a particular variable changes the
probability of the occurrence of banking sector distress holding constant the other explanatory factors. We
investigate whether economic and institutional characteristics of countries are associated with the onset of
banking distress (crises), and apply the model to evaluate the risk of banking problems arising in EMU
countries. We employ panel and cross-section data sets that encompass both distress episodes as well as11
periods of tranquility (for the countries eventually experiencing banking distress and a control group of
countries not experiencing large banking problems). This allows us to avoid sample selection bias that may
be evident in studies such as Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999) that only include a select group of countries
experiencing banking problems.
Table 2 reports the probit panel regression results using the panel data set where the dependent
variable is banking sector distress. An episode of distress is any significant banking sector problem, thus
including large-- potentially systemic--problems, as well as episodes more concentrated to a particular
segment of the banking system. The canonical model forms the baseline regression, shown in column 1, and
this set of variables is also included in each subsequent equation estimated (columns 2-7). The number of
observations varies between 604 to 919, with the inclusion of the various institutional variables limiting the
data set.
All of the coefficients in the baseline/canonical regression (inflation, real GDP growth, exchange
rate pressure and financial liberalization), excepting inflation, are statistically significant with the expected
signs. A fall in GDP growth, sharp bouts of exchange rate pressure, and financial liberalization are
associated with an increased likelihood of (the onset of) banking sector distress. These results are robust
and hold in every specification of the model.
In addition to financial liberalization, all but one of the institutional variables are statistically
significant (in either one or both formulations of the model). Well-developed banking sectors, competent
governments/bureaucracies, and conscientious enforcement of legal rights are associated with greater
stability in the banking sector. Greater disclosure on firms' public statements ("accounting"), however, is
positively associated with the likelihood of an episode of banking sector distress.  Moreover, there is also
some indication (although not statistically significant at conventional levels) that restrictions on banks'
lending and portfolio activities ("restriction") are positively associated with banking sector distress. (These
results are discussed further below.)12
In terms of overall predictive power, 44-60% of the actual episodes of banking distress were
predicted by the model to have had banking sectors that were at risk at the time, i.e. the conditional
probability of banking distress was 10% or higher—twice the unconditional probability rate of 5%.
As discussed in section 2, the determinants of large scale banking problems (crises) may be easier
to identify than the determinants of banking distress since the latter captures not only system-wide problems
but also sector-specific events that may have idiosyncratic causes. In Table 3, we report the probit
estimates for the model attempting to explain bank crises. Again the variables entering the canonical model
are significant with the expected signs. Moreover, the significance levels are considerably higher and
inflation is statistically significant (higher inflation is associated with a higher probability of a banking
problem) in banking crisis equation estimates. The overall performance statistics-- number of observations
correctly predicted and pseudo R-squares are similar to the previous set of regressions.
The results for the institutional variables in the banking crisis regressions are very similar to those
reported in the banking distress regressions. Competent governments, efficient bureaucracies and well-
developed banking sectors are associated with lower probabilities of banking sector crisis, while countries
with more restrictions on banks' portfolios and those that have seemingly high accounting standards have
had a relatively higher frequencies of problems arising. Banking sector development and accounting
standards drop off in statistical significance, however.
Surprisingly, the variable measuring the extent of restrictions on bank’s activities (restrictions on
securities, insurance and other business operations) and the accounting standards proxy are both
significantly positive, indicating that more restrictions and more information disclosure are associated with
a higher probability of the onset of a banking sector crisis. This may be explained by two factors. La Porta
et al. (1998) find that laws are only weakly protective of shareholders and that good accounting standards
are associated with low concentration of firm ownership and poor investor protection. In this way, good
accounting standards may be a response to other problems likely to increase the risk of banking sector
distress. Similarly, Barth, et al. (1998) find that tight restrictions on the banking sector are typically found13
in countries with weak governmental structures and bureaucracies. They also suggest that tight legal
restrictions on banking activities may be a response to weak bureaucracies, and are therefore positively
associated with banking sector problems.
Cross Section Regressions on Institutional Variables
The institutional variables show vary little variation across time and therefore are primarily
identifying cross-country differences in the likelihood of banking distress and crisis. Recognizing this data
limitation, Table 4 reports probit regressions using cross-section (across countries) data where the
dependent variable is banking distress (crisis). In these regressions the dependent variable takes on a value
of unity if the country in question experienced an episode of banking distress (crisis) at any time during the
sample period. The right-hand-side variables are the institutional variables either individually (in the upper
first and second panels) or jointly (in third panel).
The first (second) panel of Table 4 reports the results from the bivariate regressions with banking
distress (crisis) as the dependent variable regressed on each of the new institutional variables investigated in
this study. (Constant terms are included in all of the regressions but are not reported for brevity). There is
only weak evidence that the institutional factors play a role in the banking distress regressions, but strong
evidence that they are important in distinguishing countries that have experienced bouts of large-scale
banking problems (crisis) from those that have not.
In particular, the second panel shows that competent government/efficient bureaucracy,
enforcement of legal rules, high accounting standards and a well-developed financial system are inversely
associated with the likelihood of a banking crisis erupting.  And countries where banks are heavily
restricted in the types of activities that they may undertake are more likely to have had an episode of
banking crisis. These results are consistent with the panel probit regressions, with the exception that
accounting is now significantly negative. The cross-country probit regressions suggest, in line with14
theoretical priors, that higher accounting standards, and presumably more public disclosure of firm
operations, are inversely related to the probability of banking sector problems.
The unconditional probability of having at least one episode of banking sector distress (crisis) for
this sample is 78% (52%). This unconditional probability is obviously much higher than in the panel
regressions since a country is coded as having had a banking crisis if it occurred at any time during the
1975-97 sample period. To measure a "successful" prediction, we used the unconditional sample means as
our base of comparison. Judging by this criterion, the range of successful predictions based on each
bivariate probit regression ranges from 85-100% for banking distress and 55-76% for banking sector crisis.
Clearly, institutional variables are helpful predictors of banking sector problems.
We also ran log likelihood ratio test of the joint significance of the institutional variables. This test
is in the context of a multivariate probit regression with banking distress (crisis) as the dependent variable
and set of institutional characteristics as the independent variables. (Enforcement is again not included
since it is so highly correlated with government competence). The log-likelihood ratio test (with the base
regression including only a constant) indicates that the variables are jointly significant (at the 99% level of
confidence), helping to explain the cross-country differences in the pattern of both banking distress (0.005
significance level) and banking crises (.0108 significance level).
6
Predictions for Europe
The model estimates reported in Tables 2-4 cover all the episodes of banking sector distress in the
sample and may or may not do well in predicting the likelihood of a problem arising in any given country at
a particular point in time. That is, the model could have relatively high predictive accuracy in general but
still not predict the occurrence of any particular banking problem. Our question is whether the general
statistical characteristics of banking sector distress identified by the model help to explain the timing and
likelihood of episodes of banking distress that have occurred in Europe.15
To this end, we report at the bottom of each table the percentage of successful predictions for the
model for the set of European countries. For the European countries, the percentage of successful
predictions in the panel regressions ranged from 15-39% for episodes of banking sector distress  (Table 2)
and 25% (except in one instance) for episodes of banking (Table 3).  In the set of cross-section regressions,
the successful predictions of banking distress were 64-100% range for banking distress 0-25% range for
banking crisis. Lower success in predicting banking sector crisis in Europe (only four occurrences)
suggests that these "big" events were not so much related to legal/institutional characteristics as to
macroeconomic and, perhaps, idiosyncratic factors.
Following up on this point, we also show in Figure 2 the predicted probabilities for the 1975-97
period for the three Scandinavian countries that experienced the most severe banking crises. The line for
each country uses the coefficient estimates from column 7 of Table 2 to predict the probability of banking
sector distress in each European country for each year. The country names (abbreviated) refer to the year
when each particular country in the sample had a banking problem.
These results indicate that the model does reasonably well in predicting the banking problems in
these countries. The predicted value for Finland, for example, peaked in 1991 (at about 18 percent
likelihood of the onset of banking distress)-- the year that problems actually became acute. The model also
predicts that problems were likely Sweden in the early 1990s, when acute banking distress did emerge.
However, banking stability is predicted in Norway despite the occurrence of a banking crisis in the late
1980s.
5. Implications for European Banking Stability
How can our empirical work help us assess the risk of instability in European banking? We
evaluate this question from two perspectives: institutional and macroeconomic. The institutional
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individual coefficient values are not statistically significant (as with the panel regressions).16
characteristics of financial markets and the regulatory environment in EU area indicate very low risk of
serious banking distress. Relatively few restrictions on banks, well-developed banking sectors, competent
government bureaucracies and vigorous enforcement of shareholder rights and the strength of legal systems
all predict banking stability. Accounting standards and information disclosure are also higher in the EU
area than most other parts of the world, and should lead to greater banking stability. (The prediction
equations give mixed results on this point. However, the argument that high accounting standards are a
measure to shore-up systems with weak protections for investors does not seemingly hold in EU countries.)
Finally, all the European countries had substantially liberalized their domestic financial systems by the
early 1990s (measured here as a relaxation of interest rate controls) and have presumably already adjusted
to this frequently destabilizing effect on the banking system. Hence, from an institutional perspective, our
results suggest that Europe is unlikely to experience a major banking crisis
The evaluation of macroeconomic risks depends on how business cycles, inflation and exchange
rate instability in Europe are likely to be affected by EMU. The conventional wisdom holds that national
business cycles are likely to be larger within the EU area because of the loss of the country-specific
monetary stabilization instrument.
7 However, if European business cycles in the past are attributable to
unstable monetary policies, both lower inflation and more stable economies could be the consequence of
EMU (e.g. Thygesen, 1999). Moreover, it seems clear that exchange rate stability is likely to be enhanced
in Europe since the underlying tensions and conflicts associated with the ERM are removed. Balancing
these factors in light of our regression results would indicate that EU countries on average are likely to
experience less macroeconomic instability than the previous (low) level and much lower than most part of
the world. Both the macroeconomic and institutional variables therefore point to relatively low risk for
banking sector distress and/or banking crisis in EMU.
                                                       
7 See Eichengreen (1992) and Bergman (1996) for a review of the optimal currency area literature as it
applies to Europe.17
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Liberalization 0.69 0.47 1.00 0.00 99%
Restriction 2.39 0.65 1.82 0.39 99%
Banking 0.71 0.58 1.06 0.38 97%
Regulatory Environment
Government 6.14 2.27 8.27 1.31 99%
Enforcement 6.67 2.20 9.06 0.96 99%
Accounting 59.31 14.50 63.62 12.02 67%20
Table 2
Determinants of Banking Sector Distress
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Constant -2.13** -2.36** -1.97** -1.25** -1.47** -2.09** -2.84**
(0.18) (0.35) (0.32) (0.31) (0.41) (0.47) (0.86)
Macroeconomic Variables:
Inflation 0.20 0.22 0.17 0.15 0.15 0.29* 0.23
(0.13) (0.16) (0.17) (0.16) (0.17) (0.17) (0.18)
GDP growth -5.36** -6.44** -6.52** -7.78** -6.99** -6.65** -7.96**
(1.74) (2.26) (2.43) (2.14) (2.42) (2.36) (2.49)
Exchange Pressure 0.41** 0.55** 0.59** 0.54** 0.58** 0.58** 0.52**
(0.17) (0.19) (0.20) (0.19) (0.21) (0.20) (0.22)
Financial Environment:
Liberalization 0.84** 0.68** 0.96** 0.73** 1.01** 0.71** 1.06**












Number of Obs 919 694 627 728 627 636 604
Pseudo R2 0.113 0.113 0.145 0.144 0.155 0.124 0.172
Percentage Predicted:
Overall 45.8% 43.8% 52.4% 56.9% 54.8% 46.5% 60.0%
Europe 30.8% 15.4% 23.1% 23.1% 15.4% 30.8% 38.5%21
Table 3
Determinants of Banking Sector Crisis
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Constant -2.27** -2.88** -2.07** -1.33** -1.29** -2.30** -4.36**
(0.19) (0.44) (0.34) (0.35) (0.43) (0.54) (1.21)
Macroeconomic Variables:
Inflation 0.36** 0.41** 0.38** 0.37** 0.33* 0.50** 0.49**
(0.13) (0.17) (0.18) (0.16) (0.17) (0.17) (0.19)
GDP growth -3.59* -4.93** -4.91* -5.37** -5.61** -4.86* -6.97**
(1.92) (2.46) (2.66) (2.27) (2.64) (2.59) (2.74)
Exchange Pressure 0.38** 0.59** 0.63** 0.56** 0.63** 0.61** 0.51**
(0.19) (0.21) (0.22) (0.21) (0.23) (0.22) (0.25)
Financial Environment:
Liberalization 0.60** 0.50** 0.57* 0.52** 0.67** 0.53* 0.78**












Number of Obs 970 743 668 778 668 685 645
Pseudo R2 0.099 0.141 0.163 0.160 0.194 0.149 0.230
Percentage Predicted:
Overall 23.1% 33.3% 32.0% 34.4% 48.0% 34.6% 45.8%





Restriction Banking Government Enforcement Accounting
Coefficient 0.66 -0.78 -0.17 -0.16 0.00
P-value 0.12 0.09 0.12 0.21 0.87
Pseudo R2 0.076 0.104 0.072 0.056 0.001
No. of  Obs 44 40 47 40 39
Percent Predicted at 78%
    All Countries 89.5 88.6 85.4 100 100
    Europe 81.8 81.8 63.6 100 100
Dependent Variable:
Banking Sector Crisis
Restriction Banking Government Enforcement Accounting
Coefficient 0.69 -0.95 -0.32 -0.32 -0.03
P-value 0.03 0.03 0.00 0.00 0.06
Pseudo R2 0.079 0.095 0.199 0.192 0.072
No. of  Obs 44 40 47 40 39
Percent Predicted at 52%
    All Countries 69.6 65.0 76.0 75.0 55.0
    Europe 25.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.023
Figure 1
Economic Developments Prior to and after the Onset of Banking Distress:
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Occurrences of European Banking Distress, Foreign Exchange Market Turmoil and
Domestic Interest Rate Liberalization
Dates, Significance (Significant or Crisis)  and









1987-1992  Significant: Cumulative loan losses over




1991-1994 Crisis: Nonperforming loans and credit
losses reached 13% of total exposure at peak in 1992;
liquidity crisis in September 1991. Savings sector
badly affected. Govt. took over Skopbank in August
1991. Several banks suffered large losses due to bad
loans and share investments.
1977-1978, 1982, 1991-1993 1986
France
1994-1995 Significant: Nonperforming loans were
8.9% of total loans in 1994. 15% (US $27billion) of
Credit Lyonais’ loans were nonperforming and several
other banks posted large losses.
1982 1975




1991-1995 Significant: Localized problems required
large injection of public funds into specialized lending
institutions.
1980, 1982-1983, 1985 1975
Ireland 1985
Italy
1990-1995 Significant: Nonperforming loans system-
wide 10% of total in 1995. During 1990-94 58 banks in
difficulty and merged with other institutions; 3 of the 10
largest banks received large injection of public funds;
10 banks undercapitalized in 1994.
1976, 1992, 1995 1975
Luxembourg NA
Netherlands 1975
Portugal 1986-1989  Significant: 1976-1978, 1982-1983, 1993, 1995 1984
Spain
1977-1985 Crisis: From 1978-83, 51 institutions
accounting for 1/5 of all deposits were rescued.. In
1983, 20 small- medium sized banks were
nationalized.
1976-1977, 1982, 1992-1993 1974
Sweden
1990-1993 Crisis: 18% of total unconsolidated bank
loans were reported lost and the 2 main banks were
assisted (Govt. injected US$800 million into state
controlled Nordbanken and guaranteed US$609 to
rescue largest savings bank).
1977, 1981-1982, 1992-1993 1980
United Kingdom
1975-1976  Significant: “Secondary Banking Crisis”
 1984 Significant: Johnson Matthey bank failure.
1976, 1979, 1981-1982, 1986, 1992 197425
Non-EU Members:
Iceland
1985-1986 Significant: One of three state-owned
banks insolvent and merged with 3 private banks.
1993 Significant: Government injects capital into one
of the largest state-owned commercial banks to cover
its large loan losses.
1983-1984, 1988, 1992-1993 NA
Norway
1987-1993 Crisis: 6% of bank loans nonperforming.
Crisis at end of 1991. Govt. became principal owner in
3 largest banks whose share of total commercial bank
assets was approximately 85%. Central bank provided
special loans to 6 banks suffering from post-oil
recession of 1985-86. State-backed Bank Insurance
Fund had to increase capital.
1978, 1986, 1992 1984
Switzerland 1978 1989
Notes:
*Source of banking distress data and characterizations: Caprio and Klingebiel (1996), Demirgu-Kunt and
Detragiache (1998a) and Lindgren, Garcia and Saal (1996). Updated from Caprio et al. (1999).
**See text for calculation of measure of foreign exchange market pressure.
***Characterization and dating of domestic interest rate liberalization is Demirgu-Kunt and Detragiache (1998b).26
 Appendix Table 2: Data for Institutional Variables
Variable Description Scale Sources
Accounting
Account standards Index created by examining
and rating companies' 1990 annual reports on






International accounting and auditing
trends. Center for International and
Financial Research. Reported in  La
Porta et al. (1998)
Rule of Law
Assessment of the law and order tradition in the
country produced by the country risk rating
agency International Country Risk (ICR).
Average of the months of April and October of




tradition for law and
order.
International Country Risk guide.
Reported in La Porta et al. (1998).
Corruption
ICR's assessment of the corruption of
government. Lower scores indicate that "high
government officials are likely to demand
special payments" and "illegal payments are
generally expected throughout lower levels of
government." Average values of the months of





corruption. International Country Risk guide.
Reported in La Porta et al. (1998).
Red Tape
Business International's (BI) assessment of "the
regulatory environment foreign firms must face
when seeking approvals and permits. The
degree to which it represents an obstacle to







Intelligence Unit). Reported in Mauro
(1995).
Repudiation
Likelihood of repudiation of contracts by
government. ICR's assessment of the "risk of a
modification in a contract taking the form of a
repudiation, postponement, or scaling down"
due to a budget cutbacks, government action or
a policy change. Average of the months of April





International Country Risk guide.
Reported in La Porta et al. (1998).
Government
Average value of Rule of Law, Corruption and
Red Tape (defined above). Composite index of






International Country Risk guide and
Business International. Index also used
in Barth et al. (1998).
Enforcement Average value of the Rule of Law and




Constructed variable from data reported
by International Country Risk guide.
Also employed in Levine (1999).
Restrictions
Restrictions on banking. Average value of three
indices measuring the ability of banks to engage
in: (1) securities underwriting, brokering,
dealing and all aspects of the mutual fund
business; (2) real estate investment,
development and management; (3) insurance










Constructed by Barth et al. (1998).
Original data sources reported are Barth
et al. (1997), Kyei (1995), Akamatsu
(1995), Institute of International
Bankers (Global Survey-, various years)
Euromoney (Banking Yearbook 1995),
and various central bank and
government sources.
Banking
Banking sector development. Value of loans by
commercial banks and other deposit-taking
banks to the private sector divided by GDP.
Average over 1976-93 period.
Zero is lower bound.
Data range is 0.1 to
2.7. Reported in Levine (1998).27